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Abstract
We study the properties of decisions made by committees who select alterna-
tives by constructing shortlists. We ﬁnd that even when committees are themselves
rational, such procedures may not give rise to rational choices. A necessary con-
dition for this to occur is disagreement between committees. However, we delimit
substantially the extent of ‘irrationality’ that these procedures allow.
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11 Introduction
Suppose that your department has a job opening. Will it make a choice straightaway
from the pool of applicants? Almost surely not. Rather, it will ﬁrst create a shortlist. In
the simplest case, a committee will screen out some applicants in the ﬁrst stage, and a
second committee (which may or may not coincide with the ﬁrst) will make a choice in
the second stage. Indeed, many decisions by businesses, organizations and individuals are
made in this way. Shortlists are typical of recruiting decisions, but there are several other
examples, such as the awarding of public contracts or the commissioning of works of art.
A less obvious example concerns decisions by individuals, who may eﬀectively implement
‘mental shortlists’ when choosing among alternatives1.
The question we ask in this paper is: how rational are decisions based on shortlists?
Here we are not interested in how a committee arrives at a given selection, i.e. in how
individual members’ preferences are aggregated. We simply assume that such aggregated
preferences exist. Does the ensuing selection process satisfy the standard consistency
properties of rational choice?2
For example, suppose that Al is recruited when the applicants are Al, Bill and Chris,
but Bill is selected when the applicants are just Al and Bill. This strikes one as incon-
sistent. In particular it is a violation of the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives (equivalent in this context to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference), whereby
the choice from a larger set must remain the choice if some unchosen alternatives are
discarded.
In general, do shortlisting procedures satisfy the standard properties of revealed pref-
erence theory? Do they maximize some measure of collective welfare?
Notice that the answers to these questions hinge on two features. On the one hand,
they depend on the rationality of the committees themselves; one may expect that com-
1See e.g. Manzini and Mariotti [2] for a full theoretical exploration of this idea, and Mintz [4] for a
speciﬁc experimental study of high-ranking US Air Force Oﬃcers.
2The vast research area in agenda formation and strategic voting tackles a diﬀerent set of issues,
such as the strategic interaction between decisions made by diﬀerent committees/members in sequential
voting. We eschew these issues completely.
2mittees with ‘irrational’ aggregated preferences will produce ‘irrational’ decisions. On the
other hand, they depend on the intrinsic properties of shortlisting as a method of choice.
It is this latter aspect we are interested in this paper.
We imagine that the two committees (one for each stage) are able to produce strict
rankings which are ‘rational’ in the standard economic sense: they are transitive binary
relations. Of course, in practice, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a committee
producing a ranking of candidates by means of majority voting over pairs of candidates
may notoriously generate cyclical rankings. However, if we want to disentangle the impact
on the rationality of the shortlisting method from that of the procedures used to formulate
rankings within committees, we must rule out this possibility. One can also observe
that some pressure towards within-committee consistency may emerge from debate: for
example, when classifying candidates often one hears argument such as ‘this candidate is
better than X and worse than Y’, which may lead to transitive rankings.
The two committees may, but need not, have the same membership. An example
where committees are diﬀerent at the two stages is when hiring occurs through recruit-
ment consultant ﬁrms, that will typically provide a shortlist of applicants to their clients.
Even when the membership of the committees is the same at the two stages, it will typ-
ically produce diﬀerent rankings. The most common reasons for this are (1) diﬀerential
information on the candidates at the two stages (for example, because of an interview
at the latter stage), and (2) diﬀerent ranking criteria. And of course, if there were no
diﬀerences in the views (rankings) of the committees, there would not be any point in
having a shortlist!
We accommodate all these cases by simple modelling assumptions:
• Each committee has a strict transitive (though not necessarily complete) ranking
on the potential pool of applicants3;
• The shortlisting procedure leads to a deﬁnite choice whatever the actual pool of
applicants.
3We remain agnostic as to the intepretation of the lack of strict preference (indiﬀerence or ‘noncom-
parability’).
3Observe that the ﬁrst feature is simply a requirement that each committee be able to
produce a consistent ranking, as opposed to the committee being ‘omniscient’ regarding
the set of all potential candidates who might turn up. That is, each committee might
rely upon a set of criteria against which to evaluate candidates. Although the committees
will be faced in practice with a speciﬁc pool of applicants, we want them to be able in
principle to rank any pool that they may have to consider.
These are our main ﬁndings:
1. The rationality of the committees does not imply the rationality of the decisions.
In particular, cycles and ‘menu dependence’ can arise.
2. Violations of rationality can only arise if the two committees disagree, in that they
have opposite rankings of at least two candidates.
3. The selection process preserves some rationality attributes, by excluding certain
types of menu dependence.
In the next section we spell out the model. We devote one section each to the ratio-
nality and irrationality properties of shortlisting procedures. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a universe A of potential ‘applicants’. We choose our terminology to focus on
the recruiting example, but all the other examples mentioned in the introduction are
accommodated in the model. Whatever actual pool of applicants presents itself, it is
ﬁrst screened by a committee C1 which draws a shortlist. Then a second committee,
C2, makes the ﬁnal choice of applicant from the shortlist (to avoid technical issues which
are peripheral to the main thrust of this paper, we focus on situations where a unique
applicant must be selected).
Formally, the pool of actual applicants will be an element of the set, which we denote
Σ, of all ﬁnite subsets S of A. The selection of each committee (either a shortlist or an
applicant from the shortlist) is based on its (strict) ranking on the pool of applicants.
The rankings of the two committees C1 and C2 are simply denoted by the name of the
4committee. So we write aCib to mean that committee Ci ranks applicant a higher than
applicant b. We will indiﬀerently use the term ‘committee’ to refer to both a collection of
members and to its preferences. We assume that Ci is an asymmetric and transitive, not
necessarily complete, binary relation on A, for i = 1,2. We assume that C1 and C2 are
such that an applicant is chosen from any pool of applicants S ∈ Σ.4 The lack of a strict
ranking by a committee may be interpreted either as ‘indiﬀerence’5 or just as ‘inability
to rank’.6
Let us call the procedure just described a shortlisting procedure.
Let σ : Σ → A denote the selection function resulting from the shortlisting pro-
cedure with committees C1 and C2. So σ (S) is the chosen applicant from pool S. In
obvious notation, we have {σ (S)} = max(max(S,C2),C1).
3 The Irrationality of Shortlisting
A little thought suﬃces to show that shortlisting procedures may generate selection func-
tions which are outright irrational in the standard economic sense. In particular they fail
the basic test of ‘revealing a preference’, and (equivalently) they may generate cycles of
the selection function. Note well that this happens even when each committee is rational,
and therefore by itself generates no such inconsistency.
Say that applicant a is revealed preferred to applicant b if for some pool of applicants
S which contains both a and b, applicant a is selected. A selection cycle occurs when this
revealed preference is cyclical, that is there are applicants a1,a2,...,an such that each ai
is revealed preferred to ai+1, (i = 1,...,n − 1) and an is revealed preferred to a1. If all
pools where the revealed preference is expressed contain only two elements, we say that
a pairwise selection cycle occurs.
4One way to guarantee this is to assume that C2 is a complete ranking, but as this is not necessary
we do not assume it (though incomplete, C2 may be just complete enough to be decisive over all possible
pairs of applicants that C1 does not rank).
5In which case the lack of strict ranking will probably be transitive and the ranking-indiﬀerence relation
will technically be a weak order.
6In which case transitivity of the ‘non-ranked’ relation will probably not apply, and the ‘not ranked
below’ relation will technically be a quasiorder.
5Observation A shortlisting procedure may produce selection cycles.
To see this, consider for simplicity a trivial case in which the selection cycle is pairwise.
Let the pools of applicants in the cycle be R = {a,b}, S = {b,c} and T = {a,c} (this basic
example, which is purely instrumental and not particularly interesting for the application
of a shortlisting procedure, can obviously be extended to larger pools of applicants).
Choose the committees so that cC2aC2bC1c and no other rankings are made except the
one resulting from transitivity. These rankings produce a well-deﬁned selection function,
and the following pairwise selection cycle is immediately seen to emerge: σ ({a,b}) = a,
σ ({b,c}) = b and σ ({a,c}) = c.
A diﬀerent but equivalent way of expressing this fact is to refer to the classical Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference, which embodies an idea of rationality of choice ﬁrst intro-
duced in economics by Samuelson ([6], [7]) and then by Houthakker ([1]). It says that if a
is revealed preferred to b (in some pool of applicants) then b cannot be revealed preferred
to a (in a diﬀerent pool of applicants).7 In other words, there can be no menu-dependence
in the rankings of applicants implicit in choice. For future reference we state this property
below together with a property that, in this context, is equivalent to it8:
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: If an applicant is selected when a given other
applicant is present in the pool, then the latter applicant is never selected from a pool in
which the ﬁrst applicant is present. Formally: If a = σ (S), b = σ (T) and b ∈ S, then
a / ∈ T.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If an applicant is selected from a pool, it
is also selected from any sub-pool that contains that applicant. Formally: If a = σ (T)
and a ∈ S ⊂ T then a = σ (S).
Fromthe example given earlier it is easy to check that a shortlisting procedure may lead
to failures of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (and of Independence of Irrelevant
7Samuelson and Houthakker studied this property in the context of consumer choice out of budget
sets. It was Richter [5] who ﬁrst based revealed preferences on purely set theoretic arguments. See Varian
[11] for a recent historical survey of revealed preference theory.
8See e.g. Suzumura [10].
6Alternatives): whatever the selection out of the pool of applicants {a,b,c} one can ﬁnd a
sub-pool that contradicts the initial revealed preference.
These are rather worrying ﬁndings, because they show that which applicant is ulti-
mately selected depends on the entire pool of actual applicants, even on those applicants
who are not selected: there is menu-dependence.
Our ﬁrst result delimits a class of rankings by committees that prevent irrational
selections of this type from occurring. In particular we show that the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference can be violated only when the two committees strongly disagree,
that is when for two applicants a and b we have aC1b and bC2a. We use the term
‘strongly’ because - since the strict ranking is not necessarily complete - the rankings of
the two committees might not coincide but still not be opposite to each other on a pair
of applicants.
Proposition 1 If the selection function violates the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference,
then the committees strongly disagree.
Proof: We argue in two steps.
Step 1: Violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference imply a pairwise selection
cycle. Recall that if the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference is violated so is Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then suppose that the selection function fails the latter, so
that if an applicant a is selected from some pool S, then there exists a subpool S′ ⊂ S
in which this applicant is present but is not selected, that is a = σ(S) and b = σ(S′),
where a and b are both applicants in the pool S′. Regarding the winner in the direct
contest between a and b there are two possibilities. Suppose ﬁrst that σ({a,b}) = a. This
implies that there must exist some other applicant c ∈ S′ ⊂ S who eliminates a in the
ﬁrst committee, for otherwise b could not be the winner in pool S′. But this generates an
immediate contradiction, since cC1a implies that a can never be selected from the pool
S.
Consider then the alternative possibility σ({a,b}) = b. Since a is selected in pool
S, it must be true that (i) the ﬁrst committee does not rank b above a (for otherwise
a could not be the overall winner in S), and (ii) there must exist some other applicant
7s1 ∈ S\S′ who eliminates b in the shortlisting of the ﬁrst committee (i.e. before applicant
b eliminates applicant a, who we assumed is selected in pool S), so that s1 = σ({b,s1})
and s1C1b. Now if σ({a,s1}) = a we would have generated the pairwise selection cycle
a = σ({a,s1}), s1 = σ({b,s1}) and b = σ({a,b}). So suppose σ({a,s1}) = s1. Once
again, since a is selected overall out of pool S, this implies that there must be some
other applicant s2 who eliminates s1 in the ﬁrst committee, before he can eliminate the
overall winner a, that is s2 = σ({s1,s2}) and s2C1s1. Note that by the transitivity of
the preferences of committee C1 it also follows that s2C1b. If σ({a,s2}) = a the pairwise
selection cycle a = σ ({a,s2}), s2 = σ({s1,s2}), s1 = σ ({b,s1}) and b = σ({a,b}) would
be generated. Thus let σ ({a,s2}) = s2. Continuing in this way, since S is ﬁnite we will get
to a ‘last’ applicant sn which is distinct from all previously considered ones (which follows
from the transitivity of the preferences of committee C1) which cannot be eliminated by
any other (unless he is eliminated by a, in which case we would have generated a pairwise
selection cycle). But then it could never be the case that a is the overall winner in S, since
even if he made it past the shortlisting stage to committee C2, he would be eliminated by
applicant sn.
Step 2: If there is a pairwise selection cycle, then the two committees strongly disagree.
Obviously if there exists a pairwise selection cycle there exists a 3-cycle. Let this 3-
cycle be given by a = σ ({a,b}), b = σ ({b,c}), c = σ ({a,c}). Without loss of generality,
let a = σ ({a,b,c}). Then it must necessarily be the case that cC2a and not cC1a (because
some committee must rank c over b but it cannot be committee C1 or the choice from the
triple cannot be justiﬁed). And it must also be bC1c, since if c makes it to committee C2
(starting from the pool {a,b,c}) it will eliminate a. So it cannot be aC1b, for otherwise by
the transitivity of C1 we would have aC1c contradicting c = σ({a,c}). Therefore aC2b,
and by transitivity cC2b. This, together with bC1c, constitutes a strong disagreement
between C1 and C2.
84 The Rationality Properties of Shortlisting
Starting from the negative ﬁnding of the previous section, here we study how much ra-
tionality is given up in shortlisting procedures. We will demonstrate that shortlisting
procedures, though irrational, nonetheless inherit some consistency properties of the com-
mittees involved. The ‘menu-dependence’ highlighted above, though producing selection
cycles, can still be delimited in a stark manner. We will focus on three aspects:
1) Binariness
2) Uncovered set consistency
3) The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
4.1 Binariness
The ﬁrst consistency property we focus upon is related to another classical property of
choice, namely binariness. It states that an applicant is ultimately selected from some
pool if and only if it wins in all direct contests with the other applicants in the pool.9 This
is equivalent to the shortlisting procedure selecting an applicant from any pool so as to
maximize a binary relation (Sen [8]), hence the terminology.10 Obviously, the existence of
such a relation is a precondition for the existence of a social welfare ordering aggregating
the preferences of the two committees.
The same example used to show that the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference is
violated can be used to show that a shortlisting procedure leads to a violation of binariness.
However, here we can ﬁnd a weakening of this rationality requirement that does not suﬀer
from the same problem.
The following terminology is useful:
Deﬁnition 2 Two applicants are congruent on some pool of applicants if whenever one
of them is selected in a direct contest over any other applicant in the pool, so is the other.
9Another way of looking at this property is that the information contained in direct contests (the base
relation) is suﬃcient on its own to determine the overall winner: once again, menu eﬀects are excluded.
10See also [9] for an enlightening discussion.
9Formally: a and b, with a,b / ∈ S, are congruent on S if and only if for all c ∈ S:
σ ({a,c}) ⇔ σ ({b,c})
Note that congruence is a symmetric binary relation.
If two applicants are congruent, then they are indistinguishable from one another in
a given pool with respect to direct contests with other applicants. Binariness implies in
particular that if an applicant is selected in a given pool, then so would an applicant
congruent on the rest of the pool who were to take his place.11 This is the property we
study:
Weak Binariness. An applicant is selected from a pool if and only if any other applicant
congruent on that pool is also selected. Formally: Let a and b be congruent on S. Then
a = σ ({a} ∪ S) ⇔ b = σ ({b} ∪ S).
Proposition 3 A selection function satisﬁes Weak Binariness.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose there exists S such that a and b are congruent on S,
a = σ ({a} ∪ S) but b  = σ ({b} ∪ S). Observe that because of congruence, for all s ∈ S it
is true that s = σ({a,s}) if and only if s = σ({b,s}), and similarly a = σ({a,s}) if and
only if b = σ ({b,s}).
In order for a to be the selected applicant, it must be that any applicant c ∈ S for
whom c = σ({a,c}) is eliminated by the ﬁrst committee, for otherwise, if he made it to the
second committee, then a would be eliminated by him in this committee. Consequently,
for each such applicant c there must exist some other applicant sc ∈ S such that scC1c.
Since b  = σ({b} ∪ S), then there must exist at least one applicant d ∈ S such that
σ ({b,d}) = d. For suppose not, so that σ ({b,s}) = b for all s in pool S. Then either bC1s,
or committee C1 does not rank s and b and bC2s. In either case no applicant eliminates
b, who is then selected from {b} ∪ S, a contradiction.
11In this context, this property also implies an appealing form of impartiality, or neutrality, requiring
that the choice among a pool of applicants should be based on the relative rankings emerging from direct
contests, not on the identity of the applicants.
10Therefore, by congruence with a it must be d = σ({a,d}), and by the reasoning above
sdC1d for some sd ∈ S, so that d can only eliminate b if dC1b. If a = σ({a,sd}), the
transitivity of C1 and sdC1d, dC1b would imply sdC1b, so that sd = σ ({b,sd}), contra-
dicting a = σ({a,sd}) ⇔ b = σ({b,sd}). Then it must be sd = σ({a,sd}). But then as
we saw above there must exist some ssd ≡ s1 ∈ S such that s1C1sd. Again it cannot be
that a = σ({a,s1}), for otherwise by the transitivity of C1 we would have s1C1b, which
generates the same contradiction as before. So it must be s1 = σ({a,s1}). In turn, there
must be s2 ∈ S such that s2C1s1, and so on. Since S is ﬁnite, either we end up with
a = σ({a,sn}) or with a C1 cycle. In both cases we have a contradiction. This shows
that b = σ ({b} ∪ S).
The proof above shows, as a particular implication, that a selection function satisﬁes
Condorcet Consistency: if an applicant is selected in all binary contests with each
other applicant in the pool (i.e. he is the Condorcet winner), then he must be the overall
winner. We will show later (proposition 5) that in fact a selection function possesses a
much stronger property of this type.
It is remarkable that Weak Binariness must hold, as another property in the same
spirit does not. It may seem reasonable to require that the selection from a given pool
of applicants is unchanged following the substitution of an unchosen applicant with a
congruent one:
Another Binariness Property: Let a and b be two congruent applicants on S.
Then s = σ({a} ∪ S) ⇒ s = σ({b} ∪ S).
This property is not necessary for a selection function, as the following example shows.
Suppose the universe of applicants is A = {a,b,s,s′} and that preferences for committees
C1 and C2 be as in table 1, where preferences are displayed vertically in decreasing order.
It is easy to check that these preferences generate the selection function σ below:
a = σ ({a,b}) = σ ({a,s′}) = σ({a,b,s′})
b = σ({b,s′})
11C1 C2
a a s b
s′ b b s′
s
a
Table 1: Preferences of the two committees.
s = σ ({a,s}) = σ ({b,s}) = σ({a,b,s}) = σ ({a,s,s′}) = σ (A)
s′ = σ ({s,s′}) = σ({b,s,s′})
Note that a and b are two congruent applicants on ss′. Since s = σ({a,s,s′}) whereas
σ ({b,s,s′}) = s′, the selection function fails Another Binariness Property.
4.2 Uncovered set consistency
As we saw above, a selection function is Condorcet consistent. We can pursue the analogy
with voting theory further. Let us say that an applicant a beats another candidate b if
a is selected over b in a pairwise contest. Condorcet Consistency expresses an appealing
property of the selection function in terms of this ‘beating relation’: an applicant who
beats all others is selected overall. However, this may not be very informative, as in many
cases such a Condorcet winner does not exist. A classical alternative is to look at the
uncovered set (Miller [3]). This is the subpool of all applicants who beat all others in
no more than two steps: that is, each applicant in the uncovered set beats any other
applicant a either directly, or indirectly because it beats one applicant who in turn beats
a:
Deﬁnition 4 Applicant a in pool S belongs to the uncovered set of S if and only, for all
b ∈ S, either a = σ(ab) or a = σ (ac) and c = σ (bc) for some c ∈ S.
It turns out that the selection function has the following desirable property:
Proposition 5 A selection function always picks an applicant in the uncovered set of S.
12Proof. Suppose a = σ (S). If a is not in the uncovered set of S, then there exists some
other applicant b that cannot be beaten by a in no more than 2 steps. in particular, it
must be b = σ (ab). In order for a to be selected overall in pool S, then, there must be
another applicant c with cC1b. If a = σ (ac), then a beats b in 2 steps and we’re done, so
suppose not, that is c = σ(ac). Then again there must exist d with dC1c. By transitivity
of C1 therefore also dC1b. So if a = σ (ad), then a beats b in 2 steps. Iterating this
reasoning, since the pool of applicants is ﬁnite, leads to a contradiction.
4.3 The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
The ﬁnal consistency property we consider is a weakening of the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference which severely restricts the type of menu-dependence allowed. It requires that
if a given applicant beats another in a direct contest and this same applicant is also
selected if more applicants are added to these two, then the beaten applicant will never
become the winning one if a smaller set of those same applicants is added. It may be the
case for example that adding some applicants changes the selection (without themselves
being selected), for instance because one of them acts as a ‘benchmark’ against which to
evaluate the pre-existing applicants. However, if a group of additional applicants is not
eﬀective in this way, then a subset of them will not be eﬀective either.
Based on this reasoning, the ensuing consistency property is:
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference*: Suppose a ∈ S, b = σ({a,b}) and b = σ (S).
Then a  = σ (R) for all pools of applicants R such that b ∈ R ⊂ S.
Proposition 6 A selection function satisﬁes the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference*.
Proof.12 Suppose not, that is a ∈ S, b = σ({a,b}) and b = σ(S), but in violation of
the axiom there exists a pool of applicants R ⊂ S such that a = σ (R) and b ∈ R. Since
b = σ({a,b}), in order for a to be the winning applicant from pool R it must be that there
12It is possible to show that this property is satisﬁed even when the committees’ preferences are just
acyclic (and not transitive) - see Manzini and Mariotti [2].
13is some other applicant c ∈ R such that c = σ({b,c}) (by Condorcet Consistency). Since
then cCib for some i, it must be that i  = 1 (for otherwise we could not have b = σ (S))
and i = 2. Furthermore, since b = σ ({a,b}), it must be that bCia with i = 2 and i  = 1
for otherwise we could not have a = σ (R). By the transitivity of preferences in each
committee it follows that cC2a, so that in turn there must exist some applicant d who
eliminates c in the ﬁrst committee, before c can eliminate a, so that dC1c. But then b
survives the shortlist to the second committee, so that a will be eliminated by b in the
second committee, contradicting a = σ (R).
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied the properties of selecting applicants (or general alternatives) by con-
structing shortlists. We ﬁnd that, on the one hand, such procedures do not give rise to
‘rational’ selections in the standard economic sense of the term, as they typically embody
some amount of menu-dependence, which may possibly lead to cyclical choice behavior.
This occurs in spite of the committees themselves being rational in the sense of choosing
on the basis of transitive rankings. But, on the other hand, we are also able to delimit
substantially the scope and type of menu-dependence that these procedures allow. As we
show, they still satisfy some consistency properties.
One interesting insight of our analysis is that disagreement between the two com-
mittees is a potential source of inconsistency of the shortlisting procedure. Namely, only
when committees rank at least two candidates in opposite ways can the shortlisting proce-
dure generate inconsistent selections. In turn, this means that when committees disagree,
and only in this case, the procedure may not maximize any social welfare ordering, even
though each individual committee does so.
If one views consistency as a desideratum of collective choice, our paper has highlighted
and delimited the costs of using shortlists (instead of making a one-oﬀ decision). However,
this method clearly oﬀers beneﬁts, too, probably in terms of information collection and
fairness. A trade-oﬀ between these costs and beneﬁts seems diﬃcult to model formally,
and is an interesting topic for further research.
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